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The world has been confronting unusually large current account imbalances1 for 
so long now that international policy makers have almost stopped warning that 
these represent a major risk to the world economic outlook. Almost – but not 
quite. Seeking to avoid crying wolf, many analysts continue to include disruptive-
adjustment scenarios involving sharp dollar depreciation, fi   nancial market 
crises, and global slowdowns in their published forecasts. But now they place 
these scenarios in boxes, outside the main text, where the reader can easily 
ignore them.
How big a threat do these imbalances actually represent to the global 
economy? And how did these imbalances develop – with the United States, on 
one side, accounting for the bulk of the global defi  cit and a more variable group 
– currently Japan, Germany, China, and OPEC – accounting for the bulk of the 
global surplus (Figure 1)? This arrangement means that the United States has 
consumed more than it has produced and invested more than it has saved for 
over 15 years now. Equivalently, our trading partners, some of whom are very 
poor on a per capita basis, have willingly lent us, a wealthy country, the funds 
needed to import the resources to fi  ll the gap – now equal to about 6 percent of 
our GDP (Figure 2). If the United States were a developing country, such behavior 
would have triggered a crisis long ago. But, of course, the United States is not a 
developing country.   
In assigning blame, foreign policy makers tend to highlight American 
policy “mistakes” as having led to a decline in public and household saving 
rates in this country, while U.S. policy makers tend to point to Asian countries’ 
“ill-advised” decision to manage their currencies in terms of the dollar. Such a 
dollar peg has led, they claim, to too much production with too little domestic 
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consumption – a global savings “glut,” in 
other words, although some observers see 
an investment dearth instead. 
But cyclical imbalances are generally 
short-lived, and policy mistakes are 
usually quickly punished. By contrast, 
persistent imbalances may refl  ect some-
thing more fundamental than short-run 
policy mistakes. Such enduring im- 
balances may more likely refl  ect a major 
structural shift in the distribution of 
the world’s resources associated with 
the arrival of the New Giants – China, 
of course, but also India and the ex-
Soviet bloc countries – as key players 
in the global economy. In particular, 
the recent addition of hundreds of 
millions of Chinese and Indian workers 
to the globally active labor force repre-
sents a signifi   cant re-weighting of 
world labor markets. In addition, Japan 
and Germany – and China with a lag 
– are stepping into an unprecedented 
demographic future of secular population 
decline. In scope and signifi  cance, these 
global resource shifts are not unlike the 
fl  ows of capital and labor that accompanied 
the European migrations to the New World 
and the colonization of India and other 
regions in earlier periods. (See sidebar on 
page 10 for the economic importance of 
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Figure 1   Global Current Account Imbalances
      1995, 2000, and 2005
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the emerging giants.)         
But in contrast with these previous 
episodes, this time around the capital 
fl  ows are heading the “wrong way” – from 
fast-growing developing countries, where 
returns on investment might presumably 
be high, to mature wealthy countries. Is this 
situation sustainable? Simply stabilizing 
the U.S. current account defi  cit at its present 
level relative to GDP would require foreign 
investors to add U.S. assets worth about 6 
percent of U.S. GDP to their portfolios year 
after year – an uncertain proposition.2 
But if these imbalances do turn out to be 
sustainable, is that outcome desirable? 
If not, will adjustment occur smoothly or 
in response to a crisis? How concerned 
should policy makers be? Current opinion 
runs the gamut from “Apocalypse Now” 
to Panglossian equanimity. What are the 
potential policy implications?   
In response to these puzzles and 
concerns, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston organized a conference on “Global 
Imbalances – as Giants Evolve” in June 
2006. Our hope in gathering academics, 
fi  nancial market participants, and policy 
makers from around the globe was to gain a 
better understanding of the fundamentals 
explaining these imbalances and to 
identify policy responses that might help 
ease the way to a smooth adjustment. 
This essay summarizes the conference 
presentations and discussions. (See 
box on page 12 for a list of conference 
presenters. Their names are italicized 
when they appear in this essay.)
Déjà Vu?
A wave of international activity 
between 1870 and 1913 is often 
characterized as the “First Globalization” 
and represents another time when 
technological, economic, and political 
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Figure 2   Current Account Balances as a Percent of GDP
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Economic Importance of  the Emerging Giants
by Selva Bahar Baziki
By what criteria does one measure an emerging giant? Or determine 
which countries deserve that title? Everyone agrees that China tops the 
list − by almost any gauge.1 But at the Boston Fed conference, Shankar 
Acharya and Richard Cooper argued that India should not be “clubbed” 
with China because India is less globally engaged and contributes little 
to current payments imbalances. By contrast, Surjit Bhalla saw India as 
“China with a 5- to 10-year lag.” Other candidate giants − Brazil, Russia, 
Eastern Europe, and Africa as wholes − drew only occasional mention. 
Clearly, the concept of “emerging giant” has many dimensions, a few of 
which are discussed below and shown in the accompanying tables. 
  China and India are, respectively, the world’s fi   rst and second 
largest countries by population size, second and seventh largest by 
land area, and fourth and eleventh largest by economic size measured 
at market exchange rates.2 Together, they account for 7 percent of 
world GDP. Both economies, but China more than India, serve as drivers 
of the world economy: over the course of roughly ten years from 1995, 
China’s annual real GDP growth averaged 9.1 percent, contributing 12.8 
percent to world output growth over that 
time span. India’s average for the same 
period was 6.1 percent, and its contribution, 
a relatively modest 3.2 percent. In 2005 
alone, Chinese GDP grew by 10.0 percent, 
and India’s, by 9.0 percent. Such rates are 
comparable to those of postwar Japan in 
the 1960s and South Korea in the 1980s. 
Although China’s and India’s growth rates 
are projected to decelerate, their contribution 
to world output growth is forecasted to 
expand over the next 15 years as both be-
come increasingly prominent global players. 
 Despite their already impressive economic size, China and India still 
fall well below the world average in terms of GDP per capita.  In 2005, China’s 
per capita GDP was $1,449, while India’s was $588 − roughly 25 percent 
and 10 percent, respectively, of the world average of $5,647 at market 
exchange rates. Using PPP exchange rates, which on the whole provide a 
better gauge of relative living standards than do the market-exchange-rate 
numbers, China’s 2005 per capita income measured $6,012 − almost 70 
percent of the world average; at $3,072, India’s was just over 35 percent. 
  To a degree, these low per capita incomes refl  ect these countries’ 
histories of rapid population growth. But fertility rates have come down in 
both countries, with the Chinese rate now at 2 births per woman (1960-
2005 average: 3.6), and the Indian rate at 3 (average: 4.4). Population 
growth in both countries is currently stable at 1 percent a year. The World 
Bank estimates that China’s population will peak in 2032 at 1.5 billion 
people. Owing to its higher fertility rate, India will surpass China as the 
most populous country before 2032 and will reach 1.8 billion people by 
2050. 
2020 1995-2004 2005-20 1995-2004 2005-20
Percent
China 4.7  7.9  9.1  6.6  12.8  15.8
India 1.7  2.4  6.1  5.5  3.2  4.1
United States  28.4  28.5  3.3  3.2  33.1  28.6
Japan 11.2  8.8  1.2  1.6 5.3  4.6
Germany 6.6  5.4 1.5 1.9  3.0  3.3
Brazil   1.5  1.5  2.4  3.6  1.5  1.7
World   100.0  100.0  3.0  3.2  100.0  100.0
2004





GDP in Six Selected Countries – Actual and World Bank Forcasts
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  With their populations sta-
bilizing, rapid economic growth 
and capital deepening have 
allowed China’s and India’s still-
low per capita incomes to rise 
rapidly in recent years. With per 
c a p i t a  i n c o m e s  u p  5 8  p e r c e n t  
in China and 30 percent in India 
between 1990 and 2000, these 
countries have become magnets 
for foreign direct investment 
intended to serve their growing 
middle classes as well as to 
expand their thriving export base. 
In 2005, China plus Hong Kong 
attracted 12 percent of direct 
investment fl   ows − ranking 
second after the United Kingdom 
and ahead of fourth-place United 
States. Considering developing 
countries alone, Brazil, Russia, 
and India ranked third, fourth, and eleventh, respectively.      
  Other important indicators of emerging giant status would have to 
include the supply of skilled and unskilled workers; the size of the domestic 
fi  nancial markets; share of world trade, world payments imbalances, and 
offi   cial foreign exchange reserves; and demand for natural resources, like 
oil and coal, and the resulting contribution to carbon emissions and global 
warming. Obviously, the list goes on and on, and many of these additional 
aspects were discussed during the conference. 
Finally, as Stephen Bosworth noted, it may be well to consider how 
growing economic integration within East Asia or all of Asia – or among 
China, India, and Russia – is likely to have a multiplicative eff  ect. Ideally, 
such integration will be politically stabilizing, but it will also clearly magnify 
the growing economic impact of these emerging giants.
1 China refers to Mainland China.
2 At Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates (which equalize the price of a common 
basket of goods across countries and put more weight on the portion of the basket that is not 
traded internationally), China’s economy ranked second and India’s fourth in 2005.
 
 
Real GDP – trillions  11.1  6.6  5.0  1.9  0.6  36.4
Real GDP – rank   1  –  2  4  11  –
Real GDP – share of world  30.4%  18.3%  13.7%  5.2%  1.8%  –
Real GDP growth, yoy  3%  1%  3%  10%  9%  3%
GDP PPP  – trillions  11.1  8.1  3.6  7.8  3.4  54.6
GDP PPP – rank  1  –  3  2  4  –
GDP per capita   37,267  21,148  39,075  1,449  588  5,647
GDP per capita – rank  4  –  3  93  121  –
GDP per capita PPP  37,267  25,944  27,817  6,012  3,072  8,477
GDP per capita PPP – rank  2  –  18  76  103  –
Population – millions  297  311  128  1,305  1,095  6,438
Population – rank  3  –  10  1  2  –
Population growth rate  1%  0%  0%  1%  1%  1%
Fertility rate   2  2  1  2  3  3
Land area – rank  3  –  61  2  7  –
2000 USD,  
unless stated otherwise  United  States  EMU  Japan  China  India  World
Selected Indicators of Economic Rank, 2005
Data sources:  World Bank, OECD, and IMF.  Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) data are 2000 international dollars.Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
developments suddenly provided im-
proved global access to previously 
untapped resources and the incentive 
to take advantage of them. The resulting 
fl  ows of capital and people led to very 
persistent current account imbalances 
lasting through much of the period, 
off  ering some possible parallels to today’s 
situation. 
Beginning in the 19th century, improve-
ments in shipping and communications 
technology and widespread adoption of 
the gold standard led to a surge in 
international migration, trade, and 
investment through the world’s fi   rst 
truly global markets.3 Steam replaced 
sail, the telegraph arrived in the 1830s, 
the fi   rst transoceanic cable was laid 
in 1866, and the Suez Canal opened in 
1869. Driven by poverty, famine, religious 
persecution, and failed revolutions, the 
stream of people from the European core 
to sparsely populated North America, 
Australia, and New Zealand became a 
fl  ood as 55 million people, one quarter 
of the European population in 1850, 
emigrated between 1815 and 1924;4 60 
percent of the migrants landed in the 
United States. Capital followed them to the 
New World, while investment in densely 
populated Asia accelerated as well. 
Throughout this period, Britain, the banker 
– and venture capitalist – to the world, ran 
a current account surplus that peaked at 
9 percent of GDP. Britain was able to run 
this current account surplus despite a 
persistent trade defi  cit because it enjoyed 
signifi  cant income from massive foreign 
assets distributed throughout the empire. 
By contrast, the “off  shoot”  countries 
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settled largely by European immigrants 
and their off  spring ran persistent current 
account defi   cits. The United States 
recorded a current account defi  cit for most 
years between 1850 and 1890 as interest 
payments on its foreign debt more than 
off  set a small trade surplus based on its 
shipping services. In other words, net fl  ows 
of investment income played a key role in 
sustaining these long-term imbalances.  
In Britain’s case, its net investment 
earnings refl   ected both its large net 
asset position5 and the gap between 
the interest it earned on those for-
eign assets and the interest it paid on its 
foreign liabilities. According to economic 
historians  Christopher Meissner and 
Alan Taylor (MT), this gap represented 
Britain’s reward for risk taking and its 
talent for fi  nancial innovation, as well as 
its reputation as a safe investment haven
with secure property rights, economic 
stability, and deep, liquid fi   nancial 
markets. That the sun never set on 
the British Empire must have helped. 
But over time Britain’s “privilege” as a 
fi  nancial pioneer dwindled as investors in 
other countries gradually adopted more 
sophisticated fi  nancial instruments and 
the emerging markets of the day grew less 
risky.
A century later, the United States 
is now the world’s hegemon, a status 
that again refl  ects a talent and taste for 
fi   nancial innovation and risk taking as 
well as its economic strength and fi  nancial 
and political stability. As a result, like 19th 
century Britain, the United States has 
been earning more on its foreign assets 
than it pays on its foreign liabilities – by 
an amount that averaged 0.5 percent of 
GDP from 1981 to 2003, as estimated 
by  MT. Along with increased leverage, 
this “privilege” allowed the United States 
to earn positive investment income on 
an annual basis through 2005 even as 
it recorded a growing net debt position 
for over 20 years (Figure 3). In other 
words, until very recently this country’s 
net investment earnings helped slow the 
growth in the U.S. current account defi  cit. 
But as happened in pre-World War I 
Britain, the U.S. “privilege” has declined 
over time from 3 percent in the 1960s to 
1 percent today, according to MT, as other 
countries have adopted U.S. fi   nancial 
practices. As a result of this decline and 
the growing U.S. net liability position, in 
2006 annual investment income fi  nally 
turned negative and started to add to the 
U.S. current account defi  cit.6 Thanks to the 
magic of compound interest, this small 
change, if continued, could signifi  cantly 
aggravate the stability issue, making the 
diff  erence between a manageable pay-
ments defi  cit and an imbalance requiring 
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In this regard, however, the lessons 
from the First Globalization appear 
remarkably optimistic since, during 
that period, payments adjustment was 
surprisingly smooth. Indeed, MT fi  nd that 
adjustment generally occurred without 
the severe GDP slowdowns typical of 
many post-World War II corrections. For
the “off  shoots” and other borrowers that 
could credibly adhere to the gold standard, 
the reversal of payments imbalances did 
not generally involve a banking or currency 
crisis. Further, the countries that adopted 
the unforgiving gold standard as proof 
of good behavior did not suff  er greater 
output losses during an adjustment than 
did the countries with fl  exible exchange 
rates, possibly because labor markets 
were also more fl  exible (and wages free 
to fall) in the early 20th century. Overall, 
MT argue that the capital-poor countries 
in the First Globalization were able to run 
sustained defi  cits with smooth reversals 
as long as they invested the borrowed 
capital in productive ways that facilitated 
export growth and debt repayment. Today, 
MT suggest, the United States’ ability to 
avoid the hard landing and large dollar 
depreciation predicted by many analysts 
depends on our ability to maintain market 
confi   dence in this country’s economic 
fundamentals.  
Others are less sanguine, however. 
Suzanne Berger questions whether for-
eign capital has in fact been used to 
build U.S. productive capacity, while John 
Helliwell warns that, in an era of multiple 
fi  nancial centers, the only way the United 
States can remain a magnet for foreign 
capital is to continue producing a steady 
stream of fi  nancial and other innovations 
and unusually high returns. If and when 
the “luster” disappears, disappointed 
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Labor Market Imbalances 
As in the First Globalization, today’s 
stubborn imbalances appear to be rooted 
(at least in part) in massive shifts in the 
size and location of the globally accessible 
labor supply. Indeed, the recent doubling 
of the globally active labor force may 
be one of the defi   ning developments 
of our era. As Richard Freeman points 
out, until the end of the Cold War, China, 
India, and the ex-Soviet bloc were cut off   
from the world by trade barriers, capital 
controls, and restrictions on emigration. 
But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
China’s turn toward market economics, 
and India’s shift away from autarky, 
the supply of labor “available” to global 
producers roughly doubled from 1.5 billion 
to 3 billion people – though a sizable 
part of this “new” supply remains in 
unproductive jobs in rural areas and state-
owned enterprises (Figure 4). While some 
argue that China is hardly a “new” player, 
the country was largely closed to foreign 
investment from 1949 to the late 1980s. 
China fi  rst welcomed foreign investors in 
1982, but the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy 
scared them off  . Almost a decade later, 
Y2K investments greatly improved Asia’s 
global communications links, and China 
fi  nally joined the World Trade Organization, 
earning its “seal of approval,” in 2001.
But the arrival of this additional labor 
supply did not increase the world’s capital 
stock proportionately. Indeed, Freeman 
calculates that with the doubling of the 
world labor force, the capital-labor ratio 
fell to 61 percent of what it would have 
been had China, India, and the ex-Soviet 
bloc remained isolated. Naturally, “newly 
arrived” workers have benefi   ted from 
the opportunity to work with capital and 
technology from the advanced countries. 
But comparably skilled workers in ad-
vanced countries fi   nd themselves in a 
weakened bargaining position vis-à-vis 
owners of capital everywhere and could 
face capital “shallowing” as well.  
From the perspective of the American 
worker, China’s daunting competitive 
threat refl  ects its remarkably low wages. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
average hourly compensation in China’s 
manufacturing sector was just 67 cents 
in 2004. But what producers really care 
about is relative labor costs adjusted for 
15
Figure 4   Countries with World’s Largest Labor Forces, by Sector, 2002
* The area of each pie is proportional to the  size of the labor force of the selected region/country. Bangladesh’s sectoral distribution data are for 2000; India’s are for 2005.
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China in particular 
[has] been 
investing a surpris-
ing amount in 
education and 
R&D in order to 
“leapfrog”…to 
higher levels 
of human capital 
and technical 
sophistication….
diff  erences in productivity. And the gap 
between American and Asian labor costs 
per unit of output is much smaller than 
the gap between American and Asian 
wages. After adjusting for productivity 
diff  erences, China is probably no more 
competitive overall than is high-income 
Hong Kong or Singapore – although the 
more productive foreign ventures in 
China’s coastal provinces may have a 
signifi   cant competitive advantage. Still, 
history suggests that this gap between 
domestic and foreign unit labor costs tends 
to narrow over time as foreign productivity 
rises faster than productivity in the United 
States, but foreign wages rise even faster.
While economists used to argue that 
American workers would always do well 
if only they would invest in human capital 
and move up the technology ladder 
to “better” jobs ahead of the foreign 
competition, China and India have not 
been following the economists’ script. 
Rather they – and China in particular – 
have been investing a surprising amount 
in education and R&D in order to “leapfrog” 
(Freeman’s  phrase) to higher levels of 
human capital and technical sophistication 
ahead of schedule. As a result, Dani Rodrik 
fi  nds that China’s export bundle is far more 
sophisticated than one would expect given 
its low per capita income.8 He attributes 
this success to China’s industrial policy 
and its emphasis on technology transfer.
These Asian investments in human 
capital have produced some sobering 
statistics. While the United States 
accounted for 30 percent of world enroll-
ment in higher education in the 1970s, 
as  Freeman points out, this share had 
fallen to 14 percent by 2000. Similarly, 
in the 1970s, the United States produced 
50 percent of the world’s Ph.D.s, but it is 
expected to grant just 15 percent of the 
world’s doctorates in 2010, when China 
alone will grant more Ph.D.s in science 2006 Annual Report
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and engineering than the United States.9 
These developments are a matter of 
concern primarily because maintaining 
a leading role in high-tech sectors 
appears to require having a comparative 
advantage in scientists and engineers as 
well. Further, Freeman notes, innovation 
seems to depend on scale – on having 
a critical mass of researchers – rather 
than on achieving a given proportion of 
researchers in the workforce. While the 
United States is most unlikely to lose its 
critical mass or comparative advantage 
in high-tech industries any time soon, 
it could face growing challenges to its 
leadership role, at least in some sectors.  
But beyond this competitive issue, as 
Freeman and Bhalla point out, we should 
rejoice that by bringing modern technology 
to all, globalization off  ers the prospect of 
“making poverty history.” According to 
Judith Banister,10 the real wages of urban 
manufacturing workers in China more than 
doubled between 1990 and 2002, while 
in India11 real wages rose at a robust 4 
percent a year in the second half of the 
1990s. As a result, rapid development has 
already lifted at least 450 million people 
out of $1-per-day poverty in China and 
India in the past 25 years.12 But these 
declines in global income inequality have 
accompanied a highly visible increase 
in income inequality within China; these 
growing gaps are feeding social tensions, 
particularly in impoverished rural regions, 
as the Chinese government is acutely 
aware.
In the end, China and India will likely 
follow the path of developing countries 
before them. Wages and incomes will 
rise to rough parity with world levels. 
But the transition will take time. In South Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
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Figure 5   Fixed Capital Formation and Saving in Selected Asian Economies
                    as a Percent of GDP, 1960 to 2005
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Korea, it lasted about 50 years, but the 
enormous scale of China’s adjustment is 
even more daunting. Almost 200 million 
underemployed Chinese workers with 
huge incentives to move to better paid 
jobs in coastal urban areas remain in 
the countryside. Some 150 million have 
already moved, and more are following 
at the rate of more than 5 million a year 
by OECD estimates.13 But because the 
Chinese government is concerned about 
urban overcrowding and unrest, it is 
using a variety of schemes like the Hukou 
system14 to manage a migration that 
dwarfs the great European population 
movements of the 19th century. Still, 
if China’s urban manufacturing wages 
continue to double every decade, Chinese 
wages will approach advanced country 
levels in about 30 years, according to 
Freeman’s calculations. He estimates that 
it may take India 40 to 50 years to reach 
the same level. Other observers, including 
Alan Deardorff   and Lawrence Lau, suggest 
that convergence may take even longer, 
given the remarkable degree of home bias 
in consumption and the size of China’s 
labor surplus.15 
Of course, if Chinese wages are likely 
to rise somewhat slowly, renminbi (RMB) 2006 Annual Report
19
Figure 6   Net Foreign Direct Investment and Net Portfolio Flows:
                    Industrial and Developing Countries 
                          1985 to 2005
Industrial Countries’ Net
Portfolio Investment
 Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, Part 2&3, 1992-2006.    
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appreciation off   ers an alternative way 
to narrow the gap between U.S. or E.U. 
and Chinese labor costs. But the Chinese 
government remains very cautious about 
allowing that process to occur. At this 
writing, in late April 2007, the RMB has 
risen about 7 percent since China ended 
its dollar peg in July 2005. This gradual 
rise refl  ects Chinese concern that rapid 
RMB appreciation might harm China’s 
uncompetitive agricultural sector and stir 
political unrest in the countryside. It might 
also undermine the ineffi   cient  state-
owned enterprises and the major banks 
whose assets are heavily weighted with 
loans to that sector. 
The Essential Complements 
to Capital
The global distribution of labor and 
energy resources helps to explain the 
prevailing pattern of current account 
defi  cits and surpluses. But what explains 
the current pattern of capital fl  ows? In 
particular, why are poor surplus countries 
willing to invest so much of their savings 
in the United States, a mature, wealthy 
country? Many analysts have found 
these “wrong way” fl  ows to be a particular 
cause for concern.   
Capital is a requirement for growth; 
it embodies technology. But to make 
eff  ective use of capital-cum-technology, 
as  Brad DeLong reminds us, countries 
also need institutions like property rights, 
the rule of law, good management, and 
good governance. Unfortunately, these 
complements to capital tend to be in 
relatively short supply in many developing 
countries.16 So, while economic theory 
suggests that capital ought to fl  ow toward 
capital-poor countries, where the returns 
to investment should be high, in reality 
most developing countries are forced to 
raise most of their investment capital 
domestically.
In the First Globalization, capital 
did fl  ow from Britain to the “off  shoots” 
and to the periphery as well, but, for 
the most part, these areas were under 
British rule. Indeed, the British East India 
Company literally governed India from 
the mid 1700s to the mid 1800s. And the 
off  shoot countries were led by people who 
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had brought British and other European 
institutions with them. Even so, in the 
19th century the U.S. current account 
defi  cit generally amounted to about 0.5 to 
1.0 percent of U.S. GDP, while investment 
spending equaled 20 percent of GDP. For 
the most part, in other words, foreign 
capital covered only a small portion of the 
required investment funds.
Today, by contrast, some analysts see 
net capital fl  ows from China to the United 
States as a sign of a puzzling savings 
“glut.” But China’s situation is actually not 
unique. Japan has run surpluses for years, 
with savings outstripping investment
even in much of the 1950s. And Malaysia 
and Indonesia have followed the Japanese 
path much of the time (Figure 5). Perhaps 
world capital markets are just a lot less 
integrated than economists like to think. 
Indeed, data on net capital fl  ows suggest 
that global capital markets may be less 
integrated now than they were in the years 
before World War I – not in scale perhaps, 
but in scope. Today, much capital fl  ows 
among the rich nations, for diversifi  cation 
purposes, rather than from rich to poor as 
was the norm in the 19th century. 
But maybe this outcome should only 
be expected. After all, according to Abhijit 
Banerjee and Colin Xu, in countries like 
China and India, even internal capital 
movements are highly constrained. In 
this regard, they cite the high cost of 
monitoring assets and collecting payment 
from small borrowers and the role of 
various institutions like the Hukou system 
and regional protectionism.17 As a result
of these impediments, interest rate 
spreads between deposit and loan rates 
o r b et w e e n l o an s t o diff  erent borrowers 
can be enormous, even within a small 
geographic area,18 and the marginal 
product of capital diff  ers widely across 
regions and within narrow industries in 
both countries.  
Yet, despite these many obstacles, 
and unlike portfolio capital, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) does fl  ow to the 
developing countries on a net basis (Figure 
6). And it carries technology, managerial 
skills, and growth-promoting institutions 
with it. In addition to serving as a conduit 
for the complements to capital, FDI is also 
far more stable than portfolio fl  ows, which 
are subject to sudden stops and reversals. 
Thus, as Brad DeLong emphasized, we 
should fervently hope – and governments 
should work to ensure – that gross and 
net FDI fl  ows to the developing countries 
prove “adequate” to the task of providing 
these crucially important externalities.
Explaining the Imbalance 
in Global Savings
The United States is clearly well 
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Why then does the United States, the 
“ w o r l d ’ s  c o n s u m e r  o f  l a s t  r e s o r t , ”  s a v e  
so little? And why do the major surplus 
countries – currently Japan, China, Ger-
many, and some of the oil exporters – save 
so much? In 2004, U.S. gross national 
saving amounted to just 13 percent of GDP, 
the lowest ratio in the OECD, while Japan 
was saving twice and Korea almost three 
times as much. In the context of the global 
imbalances, however, what really counts 
is the match/gap between domestic 
saving and domestic investment. 
According to the U.S. national income 
accounts, since 1995 the U.S. current 
account has deteriorated by 5 percentage 
points of GDP. For the period as a whole, 
this development matched an increase 
in the gap between gross investment 
and private saving amounting to almost 
4 percent of GDP plus a small decline in 
government saving. But these numbers 
mask big swings in the government fi  scal 
balance, which improved markedly in 
the late 1990s and then fell by almost 5 
percent of GDP from 2000 to 2005. Within 
the private sector, net corporate saving 
has risen slightly, while household saving 
has fallen below zero (Figure 7). 
Yet Richard Cooper argues that when 
properly measured, U.S. households ac-
tually “save” a lot. Because “saving” is 
defi  ned as consumption deferred today 
to raise consumption tomorrow, Cooper 
argues that it should actually include 
investment in education and durable 
goods as well as capital gains on wealth 
(which, thanks to ongoing fi   nancial 
innovations like mortgage equity 
withdrawals, have become ever more 
Figure 7   Net Saving by U.S. Public and Private Sectors
                           as a Percent of GDP, 1995 to 2006
Corporate Profits*
* Corporate profits includes inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.
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liquid). Adding in public and private 
pension claims,19 American households 
have a good many sources of future 
income, he suggests – although, 
admittedly, the uneven distribution 
of these resources may be cause for 
concern. But overall, Cooper contends, it is 
not clear that the average household needs 
to save more – or that it is likely to do so.
Similarly, corporate and government 
saving/investment are also poorly 
measured. Corporate R&D, training, and 
branding are recorded as intermediate 
business expenses, while government 
spending on R&D and education are 
included in  consumption, not investment. 
If U.S. spending on durable goods, 
education, and R&D were considered 
saving, then U.S. “saving” would equal 
over 33 percent of GDP – hardly a sign 
that the United States is “shortchanging 
the future,” in Cooper’s  view. Making 
a similar measurement adjustment 
for other countries boosts their saving 
rates as well, but generally by less 
than for the United States.20 Still, while 
it is useful to recognize that part of 
today’s “consumption” spending  is ac-
tually “investment,” it is spending none 
the less. Extra saving matched by extra 
investment does nothing to improve 
the imbalance between saving and 
investment refl   ected in today’s current 
account defi  cit.
Turning to why the major surplus 
countries save so much (relative to 
domestic investment) and invest a great 
deal in the United States, Cooper and 
others21 point out that U.S. assets are 
attractive because the economy remains 
robust and innovative and because 
U.S. fi   nancial markets off  er  liquidity, 
security, and stability. In the major surplus 
countries, by contrast, investment 
opportunities are limited relative to the 
available savings – primarily because 
of demographic trends. Indeed, Cooper 
suggests, the demographics are key. Low 
population growth countries, like Japan 
and Germany, with declining numbers 
of young adults, have limited need for 
investment in housing, education, and 
capital equipment (Figure 8). Moreover, 
as a result of its one-child policy, China will 
soon be a low population growth country 
as well, even though as a developing 
country, it also faces huge housing and 
infrastructure needs. In China, thus, 
investment is extraordinarily high – near 
40 percent of GDP – but saving is even 
higher because of China’s inadequate 
social safety net and underdeveloped 
capital markets. The United States is an 
exception among the advanced econo-
mies as its fertility rate has remained 
relatively high, thanks to ongoing 
immigration on a signifi  cant scale. 
Why are Japan and Germany not 
investing their surplus savings in the 
capital-poor developing countries as 
economic theory would suggest? The 
theory as just stated is too simple, Cooper 
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replies, because risk-averse investors 
seek a host of legal, political, and fi  nancial 
institutions like the rule of law and 
secure property rights. Most low- and 
many middle-income countries do not 
off   er these conditions as the previous 
section discussed and the recent rise of 
“resource nationalism” in the oil exporters 
confi  rms.22 By contrast, the United States 
does off  er the required institutions – plus 
a higher return on investment than most 
other rich countries.
  The demand for U.S. fi  nancial assets 
also refl  ects the fact that many, perhaps 
even most, countries are not “comfortable” 
with freely fl   oating exchange rates, as 
Cooper, Garber,23 and Summers all concur; 
thus, many governments choose to 
accumulate foreign exchange reserves 
and invest them in U.S. Treasury securities 
at a modest return. In Cooper’s view, these 
central banks are acting as fi   nancial 
intermediaries investing abroad on behalf 
of very conservative private savers (in 
Japan via the postal savings system) or on 
behalf of savers still facing capital controls 
(as in China). And even for developing 
China, the yield on U.S. government 
securities may not look so unattractive, 
given the country’s current limited 
capacity to absorb capital. As symptoms 
of these limits, Larry Lau notes that the 
Chinese banking system continues to 
steer funds to unproductive projects, while 
the government keeps struggling to cool 
“overheated” investment spending.
Overall, in Cooper’s judgment, a large 
U.S. current account defi  cit is sustainable; 
indeed it may even be desirable. While 
the U.S. current account defi   cit clearly 2006 Annual Report
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cannot continue to rise relative to GDP, 
it can certainly remain near its present 
relatively high ratio to GDP. Demographic 
trends in Japan, Europe, and parts of 
developing Asia will encourage those 
regions to accumulate external assets 
to draw down as the population ages. In 
contrast, the United States has notably 
diff  erent demographics. Although rich and 
politically mature, it remains in a sense 
a “young” and “developing” country. The 
United States is also particularly good 
at inventing ways to exchange low-risk 
claims for high-risk assets. No wonder 
world savers want to invest a portion of 
their savings in the United States, Cooper 
concludes.
But not everyone agrees. Foremost 
among those with a less sanguine 
interpretation of recent trends in the U.S. 
saving-investment imbalance is Larry 
Kotlikoff  . Admitting to little concern about 
the U.S. current account defi  cit24 per se, he 
focuses instead on the disturbing decline 
in U.S. net investment and even faster 
decline in U.S. net saving relative to GDP.25 
Noting that government consumption has 
not been unusually high in recent years, 
Kotlikoff   blames the fall in U.S. savings 
on increased private consumption, which 
now accounts for over 70 percent of 
GDP, its highest share since World War 
II. In particular, he points to an increase 
in consumption by the elderly, which 
he attributes to a fi  scal policy that has 
been transferring money from the young 
to the old via Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid benefi   ts for decades. 
Citing Smetters and Gokhale, Kotlikoff   
emphasizes that with the aging of the 
Baby Boom generation, the present value 
of the fi  scal gap – projected government 
receipts minus projected government 
expenditures – amounts to $63 trillion.26 
At some point, Kotlikoff   warns, the U.S. 
government’s looming fi   scal gap will 
spook the fi   nancial markets; investors 
will unload U.S. government securities and 
dollars, U.S. interest rates and infl  ation will 
rise, and a disorderly correction will be 
underway.   
But as several conference participants 
observed, most other advanced countries 
face equally diffi     cult fi   scal futures, for 
which – small comfort – they are no better 
prepared than is the United States. In 
addition, some attendees suggested that 
investors already assume that the U.S. 
government will fi  nd ways to modify – or 
renege on – its commitments to the elderly. 
More basically, as Guy Debelle reminded 
the group, current account defi  cits  and 
fi  scal  defi   cits are distant cousins, not 
twins. Curing a fi  scal defi  cit need not cure 
a current account defi  cit, or vice versa. 
In this regard, Cooper  emphasized that 
while he is not worried about today’s U.S. 
current account defi  cit, he strongly agrees 
with Kotlikoff   that this country has a very 
serious fi  scal problem related to Medicare 
– now that Americans have decided that 
death is “becoming an option.” 
(How) Will Adjustment Occur? 
A Continuum of Views
Will adjustment of the current global 
imbalances occur soon and abruptly or 
over a more extended period? And will 
the costs of this reversal be modest and 
concentrated in the United States, or will 
…current account 
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Figure 9  Real Trade-Weighted Exchange Value of the U.S. Dollar
                          First Quarter 1985 to First Quarter 2007
Index, January 1997 = 100
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* Countries whose currencies are included in the Index for Major Currencies are Euro Area, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
Australia, and Sweden. Broad Index has 19 additional currencies. 
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they result in a global slowdown? Opinions 
range along a continuum extending 
– at the conference, at least – from 
Cooper’s confi  dent optimism to Kotlikoff  ’s 
heightened anxiety.  
Per force, adjustment – whenever 
it occurs – will require that U.S. output 
grow faster than U.S. demand. There is 
no other way. Narrowing the current gap 
between U.S. gross domestic demand 
and output can occur only through some 
combination of slower U.S. demand growth, 
faster foreign demand growth, and dollar 
depreciation to encourage U.S. production 
and foreign consumption. Thus, foreign 
offi   cials should stop suggesting that more 
U.S. saving, particularly by the govern-
ment, is all that is needed. As Larry 
Summers noted, more U.S. saving without 
off   setting foreign stimulus would likely 
result in an unpalatable slowdown in 
world growth. 
But as the persistence of the global 
imbalances attests, many players appear to 
be quite satisfi  ed with the current situation 
– at least for now. In addition to Cooper 
and Debelle, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and 
Garber  (DFG) are prominent among the 
analysts arguing this case. In the DFG view, 
developing countries seek to borrow capital, 
particularly FDI capital, at least on a gross 
basis. But to attract gross infl  ows in this 
post-colonial era, emerging countries need 
to accumulate net dollar collateral, which 
they post in the form of foreign exchange re-
serves. In addition, and importantly, China 
and much of Asia are convinced that they 
need export-led growth to absorb 
their supplies of underemployed 
labor. Indeed, China/Asia’s vast 
underemployment and savings are 
the central driving forces in the Bretton 
Woods II system27 – as signaled by world 
interest rates that have been unusually 
low, not high. U.S. savings may have 
fallen, in other words, but the increased 
…as the 
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supply of foreign savings is the dominant 
development. 
In the advanced countries, moreover, 
almost everyone is pleased to enjoy real 
long-term interest rates and core infl  ation 
that are somewhat lower – and wealth 
that is somewhat higher – than would 
otherwise prevail. In addition, producers 
who can access Asia’s low-cost labor have 
been co-opted. They no longer clamor for 
protection and have largely abandoned 
labor to fi  ght globalization on its own. For 
political and economic reasons, thus, the 
Bretton Woods II arrangement has already 
proved itself to be very stable.
In the DFG view, eventual adjustment, 
when it comes, is likely to involve a slow 
rise in real interest rates as China becomes 
more fully integrated into world capital 
markets; and most of the adjustment in 
the U.S. trade account will occur as U.S. 
demand adjusts to these higher real 
interest rates. The dollar will depreciate 
against the RMB but only gradually and 
moderately.28 Reserve diversifi  cation  by 
foreign offi     cials would have little or no 
lasting eff   ect on dollar-euro exchange 
rates because dollar-euro assets are 
close substitutes.
While Cathy Mann tends to agree with 
DFG regarding the likely stability of the 
current imbalances, she questions the 
desirability of that outcome. She builds 
her analysis around four Cs: consump-
tion, co-dependency, complacency, and, 
possibly, crisis. Since the mid 1990s 
U.S. consumption has increased a good 
deal as a share of GDP, reinforcing the 
co-dependent relationship between the 
United States and its creditors. This co-
dependency is based on unhealthy habits 
– an overemphasis on consumption (in the 
United States) and production (in China/
Asia) – that could last a long time. In China, 
these habits lead to a misallocation of still-
scarce resources; in the United States, to a 
…producers who 
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dangerous buildup of foreign-owned debt 
and a risky reliance on a narrowing set of 
foreign offi   cial investors who could tire of 
accumulating dollar assets at any time. 
Mann warns against complacency – on 
the part of the private investors and policy 
makers as well. 
In Mann’s opinion, adjustment requires 
both slower U.S. growth (brought about by 
Fed policy, not the integration of Asia into 
world capital markets) and signifi   cant 
dollar depreciation. Airing a somewhat 
similar scenario, William Dudley29 sug-
gested that U.S. household equity and 
real estate wealth is unlikely to continue 
growing at the unusually rapid rate of 
recent years. Thus, household saving will 
rise, and U.S. demand growth will weaken. 
As a result, U.S. interest rates will fall, 
triggering a depreciation of the dollar 
and, thus, a decline in the U.S. standard 
of living.30 Hardly a disaster scenario, 
Dudley noted, but a plausible unwinding of 
the current situation.   
In the end, Mann, joined by Larry 
Summers and indeed a growing minority 
as the conference progressed, was less 
certain than the DFG group and Richard 
Cooper that adjustment will occur without 
a crisis – especially since private investors 
show occasional signs of waking from 
their complacency. But “crisis” is defi  ned in 
the mind of the beholder, Mann suggests. 
How benign were the sharp (roughly 30 
percent31) dollar depreciation of 1985-
87 and the ensuing balance of payments 
adjustments (Figure 9)? Was that a crisis? 
For the United States, it clearly was not. 
From Japan’s perspective, however, the 
answer might be yes, since Japan’s eff  ort 
to curb yen appreciation at that time clear-
ly laid the basis for its bubble economy in 
the late 1980s and the dismal period that 
followed. While the IMF’s Eswar Prasad 
was less ready than Mann and Kotlikoff   
to forecast a crisis, as a preventative 
measure, he urged policy makers to focus 
on what countries need most for their 
own internal balance. China, for instance, 
needs exchange rate fl  exibility to develop 
its domestic fi  nancial markets and use its 
capital more eff  ectively, he suggested. 
What’s to Be Done in 
Uncertain Times?
What are the policy implications of 
today’s large global payments imbal-
ances? And how pressing is this question, 
now that the U.S. current account appears 
to be stabilizing? The improvement refl  ects 
the recent slowdown in U.S. relative to 
foreign growth and a 16-percent decline 
in the real trade-weighted dollar from its 
early 2002 peak. Looking ahead, forecasts 
for the U.S. current account over the next 
two years are mixed; many expect ongoing 
improvement, while others see a return to 
larger defi  cits relative to GDP. 
But whatever the immediate outlook, 
the current highly uneven distribution of 
world resources strongly suggests that 
today’s payments imbalances could prove 
remarkably long lasting. It will likely take 
at least three decades for Chinese wages 
to reach world levels – somewhat less 
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for Eastern Europe, somewhat more for 
India. Demographic trends are unlikely to 
reverse, even with (plausible) changes 
in immigration policies. And it seems 
improbable that the emerging giants will 
off  er all of the institutional features of 
mature fi  nancial centers any time soon. 
In the meantime, even a shrinking U.S. 
payments gap of 5 or 4 percent of GDP 
remains substantial and would leave 
the world vulnerable to a sudden bout of 
disorderly dollar depreciation. 
What then should policy makers do 
to facilitate smooth – if gradual – adjust-
ment? Particularly if this rebalancing act 
is likely to be stretched out, a primary 
concern for all must be maintaining the 
credibility of the monetary and fi   scal 
authorities on both sides of the surplus/
defi  cit divide. For the developing countries, 
in particular, the main message, loud and 
clear, is the importance of developing the 
good legal and social institutions that 
comprise the essential “complements 
to capital” found in the world’s fi  nancial 
centers. This theme, repeated throughout 
the conference, was echoed fi   nally by 
Larry Summers, who insisted that it is 
profoundly important that we fi  nd ways to 
get capital to fl  ow in the “right” direction. 
Embracing FDI, which serves as a conduit 
for the complements to capital, was one 
specifi   c policy prescription. Increased 
investment in human capital – health and 
education, especially in rural areas – was 
another.  
Further, although a fi   xed exchange 
rate may well hinder the development of 
a domestic money market in developing 
countries and clearly interferes with the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
30
conduct of an independent monetary 
policy, many of today’s emerging giants 
continue to embrace this exchange-
rate regime for reasons ranging from a 
dependence on export-led employment 
growth to fears about reversible capital 
fl  ows.  Thus,  as  Summers put it, the 
“least expensive lunch” for these central 
banks may be fi  guring out how to invest 
their foreign exchange reserves more 
profi  tably.32 In this regard, China’s new 
initiatives regarding reserve management 
are an interesting and promising sign.
As for the United States, because 
monetary policy is a blunt instrument, 
most conference participants agreed 
that it would be “nonsense” for the Fed to 
engineer an outright recession to achieve, 
at most, a modest decrease in the U.S. 
current account defi   cit. Rather, as 
Governor  Donald Kohn emphasized, the 
Fed makes its key contribution to orderly 
adjustment by maintaining investor 
confi   dence in its ability to deliver low, 
stable infl   ation. However, a few partici-
pants did note that an extended period 
of low U.S. interest rates undoubtedly 
contributed to the rise in equity and 
residential real estate prices in recent 
years and, thus, through the wealth eff  ect, 
to strong(er) consumption and investment. 
Accordingly,  Summers  suggested that 
monetary policy makers should be catholic 
in choosing the set of variables they weigh 
in setting policy, including asset prices 
and exchange rates in particular.33 For this 
reason, he argued, this is no time for the 
Fed to don a straitjacket by adopting an 
infl  ation target. 
Unlike monetary policy, fi  scal policy 
is actually well-suited to aff  ecting saving   
behavior – public saving, obviously, but 
private saving as well. For instance, policy 
makers might want to rethink the extent 
to which we subsidize housing in this 
country. Maybe subsidizing one dwelling 
per household would be enough? After all, 
to facilitate repayment of this country’s 
growing foreign debt, Congress might 
want to favor productive investment – in 
science education, say – rather than less 
productive investment in housing. Even 
more compelling is the need to deal with 
the very large fi  scal defi  cits scheduled to 
arrive over the next 25 to 30 years with 
the aging and retirement of the Baby 
Boom generation, absent strong and 
prompt Congressional action.34 Today, 
foreign investors are ignoring this 
country’s irresponsible fi   scal stance. 
Tomorrow, they just might notice.   
How workers in advanced countries 
fare will depend on the balance between 
the declines in real prices and in real 
compensation associated with the 
emergence of the New Giants. Ideally, the 
global spread of innovative eff  ort and new 
technologies will increase productivity, 
lower costs, and raise living standards 
everywhere. Thus, policy makers should 
aim to keep rising protectionism at bay 
by favoring labor over capital (which will 
be able to take care of itself). Examples 
of such policies include decoupling health 
insurance coverage from employment 
in the United States and encouraging 
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improved labor standards in the develop-
ing countries.35 Further, maintaining our 
competitiveness in coming decades will 
require the United States to invest more in 
education – in particular, in an education 
that gets students “hooked” on science 
and provides a less U.S.-centric view 
of the world. In particular, Ambassador 
Stephen Bosworth and Larry Summers 
both stressed the need for U.S. students 
to gain a better understanding of Asian 
developments and perspectives. 
In the end, U.S. policy makers must 
focus on what they can control, fi   xing 
what they can, accepting what they 
can’t, and having the wisdom to know the 
diff  erence.36 China – practical and cautious 
– faces huge domestic challenges and 
is not likely to be much moved or hurried 
by U.S. Congressional or Administration 
pressures. India’s challenges are equally 
daunting. In addressing what they can, 
U.S. policy makers might well start with 
what needs to be done for the domestic 
economy, balancing the needs of current 
and future generations. As for what they 
can’t control, U.S. policy makers may want 
to recall that despite – or was it, in part, 
because of? – the re-emergence of post-
war Europe and the arrival of Japan and 
Korea as major economies thereafter, 
U.S. employment and living standards 
have continued to rise, with brief pauses, 
relentlessly higher (Figure 10). Thus, it 
seems safe to expect that, despite the 
transitional challenges, as Chinese and 
Indian incomes reach world levels over the 
next 50 years, the impact on global living 
standards will on balance be positive, far-
reaching, and enormous.
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